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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-2341 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 5-18-cr-00040-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 
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Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges. 
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OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Ilma Alexandra Soriano Nunez was charged with 
various crimes and appeared for a bail hearing.  Conditions of 
release were set under the Bail Reform Act (“BRA”).  
Thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
lodged and executed a detainer, and she was detained for 
removal proceedings.  Because her detention for removal 
proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), does not conflict with the 
order granting release in connection with her criminal case 
under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the District Court declined 
to dismiss the indictment and rejected Soriano Nunez’s request 
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that it rely on the BRA to order her release from ICE custody.  
We lack jurisdiction over the ruling denying the request to 
dismiss the indictment and will dismiss that aspect of the 
appeal.  We do, however, agree with the Court’s bail ruling and 
will affirm that part of its order. 
 
I 
 
A grand jury indicted Soriano Nunez for passport fraud, 
18 U.S.C. § 1542; making a false representation of United 
States citizenship, 18 U.S.C. § 911; using a false social security 
number, 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); and producing a state 
driver’s license not issued for her use, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A), and (2).  Soriano Nunez surrendered and was 
brought before a Magistrate Judge.  She was then temporarily 
detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d), a provision of the BRA 
that allows for, among other things, the ten-day pretrial 
detention of non-citizens who may pose a flight risk or danger 
so ICE may take them into custody.1  ICE lodged a detainer.  
Twelve days later, a different Magistrate Judge arraigned 
Soriano Nunez, denied the Government’s motion for pretrial 
detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), and set conditions for her 
release.  The District Court denied the Government’s motion 
to revoke the order.  Thereafter, ICE executed its detainer, 
taking Soriano Nunez into custody for her to appear for 
removal proceedings.2   
                                              
1 As discussed herein, the ten-day detention period may 
also be invoked to allow state and local authorities to take 
persons on release into custody.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(d).  
2 Soriano Nunez is allegedly removable because she is 
an alien not admitted to the United States and she falsely 
represented that she was a citizen in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
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While in ICE custody, Soriano Nunez moved to dismiss 
her indictment or obtain release from detention, arguing that 
§ 3142(d) gives the United States “the choice of [either] taking 
the Defendant into [ICE] custody during the ten-day period and 
proceeding with removal or continuing with the criminal 
prosecution in which case the BRA controls.”  App. 47.  The 
District Court denied Soriano Nunez’s motion to dismiss or for 
release, holding that the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), allowed 
ICE to detain Soriano Nunez during the pendency of removal 
proceedings notwithstanding the parallel criminal action, and 
her detention therefore did not conflict with the BRA.  Soriano 
Nunez appeals. 
 
II3 
 
As a threshold matter, we must address the scope of our 
jurisdiction over Soriano Nunez’s appeal.  To the extent 
Soriano Nunez seeks review of the order denying her motion 
to dismiss the indictment, we lack jurisdiction.  Generally, our 
jurisdiction is limited to final judgments.  An order denying 
dismissal of an indictment is not a “final judgment of the 
district court.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Final judgment in a 
criminal case means sentence.  The sentence is the judgment.”  
United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)).  
Moreover, none of the grounds for interlocutory appeal in a 
criminal case apply here.  See, e.g., Heltoski v. Meanor, 442 
U.S. 500, 508 (1979) (recognizing Speech or Debate Clause 
                                              
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and (C)(ii).  Removal proceedings are 
ongoing.   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. 
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immunity as a legitimate ground to appeal denial of a motion 
to dismiss an indictment); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 
651, 662 (1977) (hearing appeal of motion to dismiss 
indictment on double jeopardy grounds); United States v. 
Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 392-93 (3d Cir. 2011) (setting forth the 
required elements of an appealable collateral order).  Thus, we 
must dismiss her appeal to the extent it seeks review of the 
District Court’s refusal to dismiss her indictment. 
 
We do, however, have jurisdiction to review the ruling 
denying Soriano Nunez’s claim that her BRA release order 
forecloses her ICE detention.  She argues that the BRA, 18 
U.S.C. § 3142, provides the sole means to release or detain a 
criminal defendant and that the District Court erred in refusing 
to extend its release order to bar her ICE detention.  The BRA 
gives us jurisdiction to hear “[a]n appeal from a release or 
detention order, or from a decision denying revocation or 
amendment of such an order.”  18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  Here, 
Soriano Nunez essentially challenges the Court’s decision to 
deny her request to enforce its BRA order.  Put differently, she 
asks us to review the Court’s rejection of her assertion that the 
BRA order requires her release from ICE custody.  To the 
extent Soriano Nunez challenges the enforcement of a BRA 
order, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.  Our review over 
whether the BRA requires Soriano Nunez’s release is plenary.  
United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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III 
 
A 
 
 To decide this appeal, we must examine both the BRA 
and the INA’s detention provisions.  Congress passed the BRA 
to address whether and under what circumstances a district 
court may release a defendant pending trial.  See United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43 (1987).  It was enacted to 
ensure “all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall 
not needlessly be detained . . . pending appeal, when detention 
serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”  
United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 87 n.13 (3d Cir. 
1979) (quoting Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465 
§ 2, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966)).  The BRA thus requires the 
pretrial release of defendants unless “no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”  18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).   
 
The BRA allows a court to temporarily detain persons 
not lawfully admitted to the United States, as well as 
individuals who are on pretrial or post-conviction release on 
other federal, state, or local charges, so that immigration and 
other officials can take custody of such individuals before BRA 
conditions of release are set.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(d).  To this end, 
the BRA directs judicial officers to: 
 
order the detention of such person, for a period 
of not more than ten days . . . and direct the 
attorney for the Government to notify the 
appropriate court, probation or parole official, or 
State or local law enforcement official, or the 
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appropriate official of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.  If the official fails or 
declines to take such person into custody during 
that period, such person shall be treated in 
accordance with the other provisions of this 
section, notwithstanding the applicability of 
other provisions of law governing release 
pending trial or deportation or exclusion 
proceedings. 
Id.  Other than during this temporary detention period, 
individuals on release arising from other offenses and non-
citizens are treated the same as other pretrial criminal 
defendants under the BRA.4  See, e.g., United States v. Santos 
Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that the 
possibility of removal by immigration authorities cannot 
provide the sole basis for denial of BRA release).  The failure 
of a government agency to take custody of such person within 
the temporary detention period means that the court proceeds 
to apply the BRA to determine whether there is any condition 
or combination of conditions that will ensure the defendant’s 
presence at trial and the safety of the community.  United States 
v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2019).5 
 
                                              
4 Thus, the presence of an ICE detainer and the threat of 
potential removal alone are not sufficient to deny BRA pretrial 
release.  See United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334, 
1338-39 (10th Cir. 2017). 
5 An agency’s inaction does not bar it from later taking 
custody of the individual pursuant to its lawful authority. 
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B 
 
 The INA, which governs immigration, gives the 
Attorney General the power to issue warrants for the arrest and 
seek the detention or release of an alien “pending a decision on 
whether [he or she] is to be removed from the United States.”6  
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  Thus, while the BRA aims to ensure a 
defendant’s presence at trial, the INA uses detention to ensure 
an alien’s presence at removal proceedings.  Vasquez-Benitez, 
919 F.3d at 552-54.  Where an alien is in the custody of another 
governmental entity, ICE officers may issue a detainer.  See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1103(a)(3), 1357; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a).  Via the 
detainer, ICE informs the agency that it “seeks custody” of 
such an alien “for the purpose of arresting and removing” the 
alien.  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a).  The INA permits an alien’s 
detention, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but not for the sole 
purpose of ensuring her presence for criminal prosecution.7   
 
                                              
6 In some instances, ICE detention is mandatory.  For 
example, aliens who have committed certain criminal offenses 
must be detained pending removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). 
7 An alien may seek district court review of a detention 
order in limited circumstances pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
See, e.g., Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison, 783 
F.3d 469, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2015) (ordering the grant of a § 2241 
habeas petition challenging ICE detention under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c) pending removal proceedings); Sylvain v. Att’y 
Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (reviewing grant 
of a § 2241 habeas petition seeking release from ICE detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). 
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C 
 
 Soriano Nunez asserts that the BRA and the INA 
conflict insofar as the INA allows for the detention of a 
criminal defendant who has been granted release under the 
BRA.  No court of appeals that has examined this assertion has 
concluded that pretrial release precludes pre-removal 
detention.  See Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d at 553 (“Congress 
has never indicated that the BRA is intended to displace the 
INA.”); United States v. Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d 266, 269 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (“[N]othing in the BRA prevents other government 
agencies or state or local law enforcement from acting pursuant 
to their lawful duties.”); see also United States v. Ventura, 747 
F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Neither side asserts that the 
BRA categorically prevents the Department of Homeland 
Security . . . from exercising its independent statutory authority 
to detain an arriving noncitizen pending removal.”).  We agree. 
 
Instead, “[d]etention of a criminal defendant pending 
trial pursuant to the BRA and detention of a removable alien 
pursuant to the INA are separate functions that serve separate 
purposes and are performed by different authorities.”  
Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d at 552.  Congress established laws 
governing the release or detention of criminal defendants, and 
the Executive has the authority to invoke those laws to ensure 
a defendant’s presence at criminal proceedings and the 
community’s safety.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).  Congress also 
gave the Executive authority to detain and remove suspected 
aliens in furtherance of its enforcement of the immigration 
laws.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
523 (2003).   
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These laws serve different purposes and can coexist for 
four reasons.  First, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) does not 
compel a different conclusion.  The text has a notice provision 
designed to give other agencies an opportunity to take custody 
of a defendant before a BRA release order is issued.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(d).  By providing these other agencies an opportunity 
to take custody of such persons, the BRA effectively gives 
respect to pending cases and allows those officials to act before 
bail is set in the federal case.  See United States v. Villatoro-
Ventura, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1140-41 (N.D. Iowa 2018).  
The BRA’s temporary detention scheme thus reflects 
Congress’ recognition that immigration authorities and state 
sovereigns have separate interests.  Had Congress wanted to 
limit a federal court’s authority to consider state and local 
interests, Congress would not have included § 3142(d).  
Villatoro-Ventura, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. 
 
In addition, if immigration or other authorities choose 
to detain the defendant during the ten-day period, then such 
detention eliminates the court’s “need to determine whether to 
release the defendant in the criminal case pursuant to the other 
provisions under the BRA.  [Section 3142(d)] does not go on 
to say that the criminal case must end if ICE pursues 
deportation[,]” United States v. Pacheco-Poo, No. 18-CR-109-
CJW-MAR, 2018 WL 6310270, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 3, 
2018), or other authorities continue their prosecutions.  In the 
immigration context, as the District Court aptly stated,  
 
the text of § 3142(d) does not suggest that it 
overrides the detention provisions of the INA.  
Rather, it instructs the district court that, after the 
temporary detention period, it should proceed to 
a determination of pretrial release under the 
  
11 
 
BRA.  Nothing in the text of the BRA prevents 
ICE from enforcing a detainer or taking a 
defendant into custody for removal proceedings 
after an order of release under the BRA. 
App. 15-16.   
 
Second, nothing in the BRA gives a district court the 
authority to compel another sovereign or judge in federal 
administrative proceedings to release or detain a defendant.  
The BRA applies to federal criminal proceedings, and 
detention and release decisions in those cases are subject to the 
BRA.  Detention and release decisions by immigration and 
other government officials are subject to different statutory 
frameworks.  
 
Third, detention for removal purposes does not infringe 
on an Article III court’s role in criminal proceedings.  In a 
criminal case, the court is tasked with deciding whether there 
are conditions of release that will ensure the defendant’s 
appearance and the safety of the community.  Vasquez-
Benitez, 919 F.3d at 550-51.  It carries out this duty without 
regard to whether a separate entity with different duties may 
reach a different conclusion.  In an immigration case, those 
authorities are focused on enforcing the immigration laws and 
nothing in the BRA prevents them from acting pursuant to their 
lawful duties, which include detaining aliens for removal 
purposes.  Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d at 269 (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(2)).   
 
Fourth and relatedly, nothing in either the INA or the 
BRA gives a court the authority to require the Executive to 
choose which laws to enforce.  Pacheco-Poo, 2018 WL 
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6310270, at *5.  Like our sister courts of appeals, we too must 
follow the principle that “courts are not at liberty to pick and 
choose among congressional enactments, and when two 
statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, 
absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary, to regard each as effective.”  Vasquez-Benitez, 919 
F.3d at 553 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 
(1974)); see also Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d at 268-69.   
 
Because (1) the BRA explicitly applies only to federal 
criminal proceedings, not state or immigration proceedings, (2) 
there is no textual conflict between the BRA and the INA, (3) 
these statutes serve different purposes, and (4) criminal and 
removal processes can proceed simultaneously, Pacheco-Poo, 
2018 WL 6310270, at *6, the District Court correctly declined 
to hold that Soriano Nunez’s BRA release order mandated her 
release from ICE detention.8    
 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal in 
part and affirm in part. 
                                              
8 The record here does not indicate that the purpose of 
ICE detention was to circumvent a district court’s BRA release 
order.  Ventura, 747 F. App’x at 21.  We therefore take no 
position on the remedies an alien may have or relief a court in 
a criminal case may grant if such evidence were presented. 
